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II.-156 
SILENT INTENT? ANALYZING THE 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT REQUIRED TO 
ABROGATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Abstract: On February 26, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III) held that Congress did not intend to 
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity through the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, 
Title 11 of the U.S. Code. In so holding, the Sixth Circuit split from the Ninth Cir-
cuit and emphasized the long-held principle that all ambiguities in statutes be con-
strued in a manner that favors the Indian tribes. This Comment argues that the 
Sixth Circuit properly applied the standard that the Ninth Circuit failed to respect: 
namely, that Congress must express an unequivocal intent to abrogate an Indian 
tribe’s sovereign immunity. 
INTRODUCTION 
Indian tribes have long been considered distinct political communities that 
pre-exist the United States Constitution, and as such, retain many of their rights 
to self-governance.1 The rights that Indian tribes retain include the immunity 
from suit traditionally provided to other sovereign entities.2 This tribal sovereign 
immunity is subject to restriction only by a tribe itself or by Congress, which has 
the power to abrogate the immunity through an unequivocal expression of its 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. 515, 559 (1932)) (explaining that Indian tribes retain power over internal and social relations 
despite no longer retaining full sovereignty). 
 2 Id. at 58. The first Supreme Court case to explicitly hold that Indian tribes possess a level of 
immunity from suit similar to other sovereigns occurred in 1940. See United States v. U.S. Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (holding that an Indian tribe should retain the same level of im-
munity that it possessed when it was considered a separate sovereign); see also William Wood, It 
Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1594 (2013) 
(noting that the Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the doctrine of tribal immunity in Fidelity). 
The overarching policy goal of providing this type of immunity to Indian tribes was to allow these 
tribes to continue to self-govern and to encourage their economic growth. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. 
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991) (citing California v. Cabazon Band 
of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987)) (stating that congressional decisions upholding the 
tribal immunity doctrine demonstrate the congressional goal of encouraging a tribe’s ability to be self-
sufficient and to develop economically). In general, boundaries to this immunity exist when Congress 
expressly permits a lawsuit, or the tribe itself waives its immunity. Ryan Seelau, In Defense of Tribal 
Sovereign Immunity: A Pragmatic Look at the Doctrine as a Tool for Strengthening Tribal Courts, 90 
N.D. L. REV. 121, 138 (2014). This tribal immunity, however, only applies to the tribe itself or tribe-
owned businesses and does not provide immunity to individual members of the tribe for their individ-
ual actions. Id.  
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intent to do so.3 Recently, this power of tribal immunity has become more perva-
sive as a result of the growth in economic activity between tribes and non-tribal 
parties, increasing the potential impact of this immunity for both Indian tribes 
and potential non-tribal legal adversaries.4 
In 2019, in Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of 
Chippewa Indians (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Congress did not unequivocally intend 
to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity by enacting the Bankruptcy Code of 
1978.5 Thus, according to the Sixth Circuit, aggrieved parties cannot sue Indian 
tribes for actions resulting from the filing of a bankruptcy petition under the 
Bankruptcy Code.6 
The prevailing issue in In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III was whether 
Congress intended to include Indian tribes within the meaning of the phrase 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) (stating that an Indian tribe can only 
be sued under federal law if the tribe waived its tribal immunity, or if Congress has taken an action to 
authorize the suit). Congress has been able to authorize suits against Indian tribes for over a century. 
See Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 373–74 (8th Cir. 1895) (explaining that Congress’s 
power to pass acts that authorize lawsuits against Indian tribes has never been in doubt and that Con-
gress has done so numerous times in the past). The Eighth Circuit justified Congress’s ability to au-
thorize suits against Indian tribes, and therefore abrogate any immunity, because Indian tribes are 
domestic and dependent states, rather than completely sovereign states. See id. at 375 (noting that 
although Indian tribes do possess significant self-governance rights, they are still subject to the juris-
diction and authority of the United States, and as a result, the United States is able to authorize suits 
against these tribes); see also Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561 (holding that an Indian tribe is its own “na-
tion” and that only United States federal law, and not individual states, can place legal boundaries on a 
tribe). 
 4 See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758 (noting that tribal immunity was originally meant to protect a 
tribe’s ability to self-govern, but now covers a number of off-reservation commercial activities, in-
cluding sales of cigarettes, that could potentially put individuals dealing with these tribes at a risk of 
harm without any recourse); see also Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American 
Indian Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597, 601–02 (2004) (explaining that Indian tribes 
have begun offering an increasing number of commercial services, including the opening of banks, 
operating retail and tourist enterprises, and serving as cell phone and internet service providers). Re-
cently, this doctrine of tribal immunity has come under increased scrutiny as it has continued to ex-
tend beyond its original purpose. See Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 
F.3d 917, 922 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758) (noting that the doctrine of tribal 
immunity could potentially lead to unfair results, but that it is Congress, rather than the courts, that 
needs to change the contours of this immunity); see also Hunter Malasky, Note, Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity and the Need for Congressional Action, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2469, 2475, 2481 (2018) (explain-
ing that the doctrine of tribal immunity has provided a means of avoiding lawsuits against Indian 
tribes in cases involving a number of different commercial transactions occurring off of tribal lands). 
 5 Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (In re Greek-
town Holdings, LLC III), 917 F.3d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 6 See id. at 467 (holding that the cited provisions of the Bankruptcy Code lack the requisite clarity 
to abrogate tribal immunity and that a tribe could not be sued under such provisions). See generally 11 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2018) (stating that sovereign immunity is abrogated for “governmental units” and 
also defining governmental units to include “other foreign or domestic governments,” without specifi-
cally mentioning Indian tribes). 
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“governmental unit” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).7 After analyzing relevant 
Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit split with the Ninth Circuit by hold-
ing that insufficient evidence existed to demonstrate that Congress unequivocal-
ly intended to abrogate tribal immunity in the Bankruptcy Code.8 In so ruling, 
the Sixth Circuit adopted reasoning similar to that of a recent Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ decision, in which the Seventh Circuit held that Congress did 
not intend to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in a statute with language simi-
lar to that of the Bankruptcy Code.9 
Part I of this Comment discusses the factual and procedural history of In re 
Greektown Holdings, LLC III and provides a legal background of the doctrine of 
tribal sovereign immunity.10 Part II examines and discusses the different posi-
tions argued before the Sixth Circuit as well as in previous cases related to the 
potential abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.11 Finally, Part III argues that 
                                                                                                                           
 7 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 456. Specifically, a “governmental unit” is 
defined as “United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; de-
partment, agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States trustee while serving 
as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, 
or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(27). Congress abrogated 
the sovereign immunity for all “governmental units” in the Bankruptcy Code, forcing the Sixth Circuit 
to assess whether this abrogation for all governmental units extended to Indian tribes. Id. § 106; see In 
re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 456 (noting that the plaintiff asserted the definition of a 
“governmental unit” included in the Bankruptcy Code demonstrated Congress’s unequivocal intent to 
abrogate tribal immunity). 
 8 Compare In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 461 (explaining that the definition of 
a “governmental unit” in the Bankruptcy Code is not an unequivocal expression of congressional 
intent such that it would abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, as the definition is not sufficiently de-
scriptive); with Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing that the Bankruptcy Code contained sufficient evidence of congressional intent to abrogate sover-
eign immunity as the phrase “other foreign or domestic government,” which is included in the defini-
tion of a “governmental unit,” includes Indian tribes). 
 9 See In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 460 (noting that simply including govern-
mental units within the list of entities for which sovereign immunity is abrogated is not evidence of 
unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate tribal immunity); see also Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of 
Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the inclusion of the term “govern-
ment” in the definition of a person within the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act is not an une-
quivocal expression of congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity). In addition to the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a number of lower courts throughout the country have also ruled 
that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code did not abrogate tribal immunity. See, e.g., Bucher v. Da-
kota Fin. Corp. (In re Whitaker), 474 B.R. 687, 695 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012); Subranni v. Navajo Times 
Publ’g Co. (In re Star Group Comm’ns, Inc.), 568 B.R. 616, 622 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2016). In contrast, 
several bankruptcy courts used similar reasoning to that of the Ninth Circuit, ruling that Congress did 
abrogate tribal immunity in the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Platinum Oil Props., LLC, 465 B.R. 
621, 643 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011); Russell v. Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation (In re Russell), 293 B.R. 
34, 44 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003). 
 10 See infra notes 13–37 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 38–65 and accompanying text. 
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the Sixth Circuit properly applied the unequivocal intent standard in assessing 
tribal sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Code.12 
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT 
The Supreme Court formally upheld the doctrine of tribal sovereign im-
munity in 1978, the same year in which Congress passed the current Bankruptcy 
Code.13 Thus, the issue of whether Congress abrogated tribal sovereign immuni-
ty through the Bankruptcy Code has troubled courts throughout the country for 
nearly the entire existence of the doctrine and the Code.14 Section A of Part I 
provides an overview of tribal sovereign immunity in the United States and the 
relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Code.15 Section B details the factual back-
ground of In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III and the procedural history of the 
case from its initiation in bankruptcy court, through its appeal to the district 
court, and finally to its appeal in the Sixth Circuit.16 
A. History of Indian Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Relevant  
Bankruptcy Code Provisions 
Indian tribes possess a level of common-law sovereign immunity that can 
only be abrogated through actions by Congress or through waiver by the tribe 
itself.17 Congress originally granted this sovereign immunity to Indian tribes to 
protect the tribes’ ability to self-govern.18 To encourage a policy of tribal self-
governance and self-sufficiency, the Supreme Court has held that all ambiguities 
in federal laws should be interpreted in a manner that benefits the Indian tribes.19 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 66–82 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 (holding that plaintiffs cannot bring a lawsuit against 
Indian tribes unless Congress allows the lawsuit, thereby affirming tribal sovereign immunity); In re 
Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 456 (explaining that the Supreme Court decided Santa 
Clara Pueblo just six months before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 14 Compare In re Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 910, 917 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) (concluding that Con-
gress intended for the Bankruptcy Code to apply to Indian tribes), with In re Nat’l Cattle Congress, 
247 B.R. 259, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (holding that Congress did not abrogate Indian tribes’ 
ability to be immune from suit through the Bankruptcy Code). 
 15 See infra notes 17–24 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 25–37 and accompanying text. 
 17 Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754; see also Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 (explaining that a 
lawsuit cannot be brought against an Indian tribe unless Congress clearly intends to allow the lawsuit). 
 18 See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758 (explaining that Congress initially recognized this tribal 
sovereign immunity because it believed the immunity was necessary to protect Indian tribes from 
encroachment by the individual states). 
 19 See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (explaining that courts 
should not use the standard statutory interpretation methods while analyzing statutes when an Indian 
tribe is involved); see, e.g., Meyers, 836 F.3d at 827 (holding that the definitions within the Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transaction Act did not demonstrate an unequivocal expression of congressional 
intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity as the court resolved a perceived ambiguity in the statute 
in favor of the tribal immunity). Congress previously passed a statute that expressly states a policy 
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In assessing whether Congress has authorized a lawsuit against a sovereign enti-
ty, the first step is to determine whether Congress’s intent to abrogate the im-
munity was unequivocal.20 Courts have held that this unequivocal expression 
does not need to specifically mention the Indian tribes by name, but the statute 
itself must leave no doubt as to the clarity of congressional intent.21 
In § 106 the Bankruptcy Code, Congress abrogated the sovereign immunity 
of all “governmental units” with respect to a number of listed sections of the 
Code.22 Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines a “governmental unit” to 
include a number of specific entities, and also includes a general clause that 
“other foreign or domestic governments” are considered governmental units.23 
As such, in In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, the Sixth Circuit needed to as-
sess whether Congress unequivocally intended to include tribal governments 
                                                                                                                           
goal of encouraging tribes to grow economically and become self-sufficient. See 25 U.S.C. § 1451 
(2018) (declaring a policy that Congress would aid Indian tribes so that these tribes would eventually 
be able to provide fully for themselves). 
 20 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (describing how the requirement of 
an unequivocal expression mandates a presumption that Indian tribes possess this tribal sovereign 
immunity); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1980) (explain-
ing that any ambiguity in a federal law is construed in a manner that favors tribal independence). 
 21 See In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 461 (explaining that in order for courts to 
find congressional intent, the statute does not need to include “magic words”). Although the Supreme 
Court has stated that Congress does not need to explicitly specify that Indian tribes are included in a 
statute to abrogate tribal immunity, there are no instances in which the Supreme Court has found une-
quivocal congressional intent without some mention of Indian tribes within the statute. See Fed. Avia-
tion Admin. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291 (2018) (noting that the Court has never required Congress 
to state its intent in any particular manner, including the use of specific words); Meyers, 836 F.3d at 
824–25 (citing Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Papas (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC II), 532 
B.R. 680, 693 (E.D. Mich. 2015)) (noting that there are no Supreme Court cases that identified con-
gressional intent without explicit mention of Indian tribes, and that the only circuit case to find such 
intent was Krystal Energy Co.). 
 22 11 U.S.C. § 106. The applicable sections for which sovereign immunity is abrogated under this 
definition include § 544 and § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, under which the plaintiff in Buchwald 
Capital Advisors, LLC made its claims. Id. (noting that sovereign immunity is abrogated with respect 
to both § 544 and § 550, among other sections of the Bankruptcy Code); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant 
Buchwald Capital Advisors LLC at 12, In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d 451 (No. 18-
1165) [hereinafter Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant]. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant 
tribe fraudulently transferred money to a number of related entities prior to filing a petition for bank-
ruptcy protection. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 454. The defendants sought avoid-
ance of these potentially fraudulent transfers under § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code as well as recovery 
of the money from these transfers under § 550 of the Code. Id. at 455; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550 
(2018) (providing for the avoidance of fraudulent transfers and the potential recovery of money from 
the fraudulent transfers, respectively). 
 23 11 U.S.C. § 101(27). Specifically, under the Bankruptcy Code, the term “governmental unit” 
includes the following entities: “United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipali-
ty; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States 
trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a 
Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.” Id. 
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within the meaning of “other foreign or domestic government,” as Congress did 
not specifically include Indian tribes within the statutory definition.24 
B. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC’s Factual and Procedural History 
In 2000, the Defendant-Appellee Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indi-
ans (Tribe) opened the Greektown Casino (Casino) in Detroit, Michigan.25 Al-
most immediately after opening the Casino, the Tribe experienced financial 
troubles.26 In response to this financial strain, the Tribe altered the Casino’s 
ownership structure and created a new entity, Greektown Holdings, LLC (Hold-
ings).27 In December of 2005, Holdings transferred approximately $177 million 
to a number of entities, including the original part owners of the Casino, Monroe 
Partners, LLC (Monroe), and to the Tribe itself.28 Despite these reorganizational 
efforts, by April 2008, the Tribe could no longer operate due to its increasing 
financial obligations.29 Accordingly, in May 2008, Holdings and the Casino 
(Debtors) filed a petition for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.30 Under the Tribe’s reorganization plan, the Greektown Liti-
                                                                                                                           
 24 See In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 456, 459–60 (explaining that simply prov-
ing that Indian tribes are both domestic and a form of government does not prove the congressional 
intent required to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity). 
 25 Id. at 454; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 22, at 3. The Greektown Casino (Casino) 
opened with the assistance of Defendant-Appellee Kewadin Casinos Gaming Authority, a political 
subdivision of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (Tribe). Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 
supra note 22, at 3. 
 26 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 454; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 
22, at 3. These financial troubles were the result of two obligations the Tribe incurred related to the 
Casino. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 454. First, in 2000, the Tribe paid Monroe 
Partners, LLC (Monroe) $265 million in exchange for Monroe’s 50% interest in the Casino, allowing 
the Tribe to obtain a 100% ownership of the Casino. Id. The Plaintiffs, Buchwald Capital Advisors, 
LLC, serving as litigation trustee (Trustee) for the Greektown Litigation Trust (Trust), alleged that 
this amount was substantially more than the actual market value at the time. Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant, supra note 22, at 7. Second, in 2002, the Tribe paid the City of Detroit $200 million as part 
of a Development Agreement to build a hotel at the Casino site in exchange for a gaming license from 
the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB). In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 454; 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 22, at 8. 
 27 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 454; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 
22, at 8. This new entity became the owner of the Casino. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 
F.3d at 454. The Tribe refinanced its debt using this new entity and also raised capital to help pay for 
its existing financial obligations. Id. In total, Greektown Holdings, LLC (Holdings) took on approxi-
mately $375 million in debt, which consisted of a $190 million term loan, a $100 million revolving 
credit facility and senior notes worth $185 million. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 22, at 9. 
The MGCB conditioned its approval to this restructuring on strict financial covenants imposed on the 
Tribe. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 454. 
 28 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 454. Of this $177 million, Holdings transferred 
at least $145 million to the former owners of Monroe, and at least $6 million to the Tribe. Id. 
 29 Id. (explaining that the Tribe was on the verge of losing both its Casino ownership rights and 
its Michigan gaming license due to its financial obligations). 
 30 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 22, at 10. A debtor will typically file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection as a way to receive legal protection and simultaneously reorganize its financial 
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gation Trust (Trust) would pursue the unsecured claims against the Debtors’ es-
tate, and the Plaintiff, Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC (Trustee), became the 
litigation trustee for the Trust.31 
In 2010, the Trustee filed a complaint in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan alleging that Holdings had fraudulent-
ly transferred $177 million for the benefit of the Tribe.32 The Tribe filed a mo-
tion to dismiss the complaint, arguing it possessed tribal sovereign immunity.33 
The bankruptcy court initially denied the Tribe’s motion to dismiss and 
held that Congress unequivocally intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity 
through § 101(27) and § 106 of the Bankruptcy Code.34 The District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan reversed this decision, finding insufficient evi-
dence of congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the Bank-
                                                                                                                           
structure to continue to operate with limited obligations in the future. In re Gibson Group, Inc., 66 
F.3d 1436, 1442 (6th Cir. 1995). The purpose of this reorganization is to ensure that a debtor does not 
go into liquidation, as it is more economically efficient to use assets within a reorganization than to 
sell such assets in liquidation. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6179. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, all actions by creditors against the debtor are 
stayed. Id. The debtor then discusses its financial obligations with its creditors in an attempt to negoti-
ate a solution to the debtor’s financial issues. Id. The debtor next creates a reorganization plan, which 
specifies how much each creditor will be paid, among other items. Id. A certain percentage of impact-
ed creditors must accept this plan of reorganization before it can go before a bankruptcy court. Id. at 
221. After creditors and stockholders agree, the bankruptcy court will assess whether all legal re-
quirements are met. Id. If all requirements are met, the court will accept the plan, and the debtor 
emerges from the bankruptcy proceedings as a reorganized company. Id. A Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding therefore differs from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, in which the sole motivation is 
maximizing value from the bankruptcy estate, by instead attempting to provide an opportunity for the 
debtor’s operations to continue in the future. In re Gibson Group, Inc., 66 F.3d at 1442. 
 31 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 454. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may 
file a reorganization plan which designates classes of unsecured and secured claims as part of the 
bankruptcy proceedings, as well as the treatment of claims that are impaired under the plan of reor-
ganization. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121, 1123 (2018). An unsecured claim is “a claim by a creditor who does 
not have a lien or a right of setoff against the debtor’s property.” Unsecured Claim, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). In contrast, a secured claim is defined as “a claim held by a creditor 
who has a lien or a right of setoff against the debtor’s property.” Secured Claim, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra. 
 32 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 454–55; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra 
note 22, at 12. The Trustee sought avoidance and recovery of the $177 million under § 544 and § 550 
of the Bankruptcy Code. Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 455. Specifically, § 544 of 
the Bankruptcy Code provides for the potential avoidance of fraudulent transfers, whereas § 550 pro-
vides for the potential recovery of the money from these transfers. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 550. 
 33 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 455. In response, the Trustee argued that the 
Tribe did not possess immunity under these claims because Congress had abrogated this potential 
immunity through its enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, and that the Tribe waived its immunity by 
deciding to file for bankruptcy protection. Id. 
 34 Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Papas (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC I), 516 B.R. 462, 
473, 476 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (holding that Congress’s use of the phrase “domestic government” 
demonstrated sufficient intent of its desire to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity within the Bankrupt-
cy Code). 
2020] Congressional Requirements to Abrogate Tribal Immunity II.-163 
ruptcy Code.35 Finally, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision as 
it similarly held that Congress, through its enactment of § 101(27) and § 106 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, did not unequivocally express its intent to abrogate tribal 
sovereign immunity.36 The Trustee subsequently filed a petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court, and this petition is currently pending.37 
II. INTERPRETING THE UNEQUIVOCAL INTENT REQUIREMENT:  
CIRCUIT COURTS DISAGREE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF  
UNEQUIVOCAL CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Although it is firmly established that congressional intent must be unequiv-
ocal to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity within a statute, the circuit courts 
have differed in their application of this standard.38 Section A of Part II discusses 
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the potential abrogation of immunity within the 
Bankruptcy Code using the unequivocal intent standard.39 Section B of this Part 
discusses the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the potential abrogation of tribal sov-
ereign immunity within the Fair and Accurate Credit and Transactions Act.40 
Finally, Section C examines the Sixth Circuit’s application of the unequivocal 
congressional intent requirement to the definitions included within the Bank-
ruptcy Code.41 
                                                                                                                           
 35 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC II, 532 B.R. at 684. The district court then remanded to the 
bankruptcy court to decide whether the Tribe had waived its tribal immunity through its actions in the 
bankruptcy litigation. Id. The court ultimately deemed the Tribe’s litigation conduct insufficient to waive 
the tribal sovereign immunity. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 455. The district court 
affirmed this ruling and further held that a waiver of immunity cannot be implied through actions per-
formed by the conduct of an agent or alter-ego of a tribe. Id. In this instance, the plaintiffs argued that the 
Debtors, acting as an alter-ego of the Tribe, waived the Tribe’s immunity by filing for bankruptcy protec-
tion. Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 584 B.R. 706, 712 
(E.D. Mich. 2018). The district court determined that a tribe can only waive its immunity through an 
explicit agreement, or through a board resolution, and that no court has ever applied the “alter-ego” theo-
ry to waivers of tribal immunity. Id. at 713 (citing Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., 
Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir. 2009); id. at 719. 
 36 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 461. 
 37 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d 451 (No. 18-
1165). 
 38 Compare Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 2016) (hold-
ing that the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act did not contain sufficient evidence of congres-
sional intent to abrogate tribal immunity), with Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 
1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code contained sufficient evidence of congression-
al intent to abrogate sovereign immunity). 
 39 See infra notes 42–49 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 50–58 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 59–65 and accompanying text. 
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A. Government Means Government: The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis of 
Unequivocal Congressional Intent 
In 2004, in Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Congress expressed an unequivocal intent 
to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the Bankruptcy Code.42 In assessing 
whether the congressional action was unequivocal and explicit, the Ninth Circuit 
first analyzed the actual wording of the Bankruptcy Code and noted that Con-
gress abrogated the immunity of “foreign and domestic governments” within the 
Bankruptcy Code.43 Next, the Ninth Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent 
to establish that Indian tribes are considered both domestic and a form of gov-
ernment.44 As the Supreme Court has previously considered Indian tribes to be 
domestic governments, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress intended to 
abrogate the immunity of Indian tribes through the definitions included within 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1061 (holding that Congress acted to unequivocally abro-
gate tribal sovereign immunity by including the phrase “foreign or domestic government” within the 
Bankruptcy Code). In this case, the Ninth Circuit assessed the potential abrogation of tribal sovereign 
immunity that arose from actions taken by Krystal Energy Co. (Krystal) against the Navajo Nation 
tribe under §§ 505 and 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1055–56. Specifically, Krystal filed a peti-
tion for bankruptcy protection and sought a determination of tax amounts due to the Navajo Nation 
under § 505 of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as the turnover of assets under § 542 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation (In re Krystal Energy Co.), 308 B.R. 48, 50 (D. Ariz. 
2002). Under § 505, the bankruptcy court has a broad ability to determine the amount of tax a debtor 
must pay as part of a bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 505 (2018); see also David W. Patton, 
Comment, Bankruptcy Courts’ Authority Under § 505, 34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 643, 643 (2018) 
(explaining that the bankruptcy court’s authority in assessing taxes under § 505 is “essentially limit-
less” and that there are only three small exceptions to the court’s power). Krystal filed a proceeding 
against the Navajo Nation under this provision in order for the court to determine the amount of tax 
Krystal owed to the tribe during Krystal’s bankruptcy proceedings. In re Krystal Energy Co., 308 B.R. 
at 50. Additionally, under § 542 of the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding has the ability to compel an entity to return all property interests so that the estate could use or 
sell such property during the bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 542. Krystal sought the return of 
specific assets from the Navajo Nation in accordance with this section. In re Krystal Energy Co., 308 
B.R. at 50. The Navajo Nation filed a motion to dismiss these two claims on the grounds that they 
were barred, as the tribe possessed immunity from suit under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. The district 
court dismissed the suit as it determined that Congress did not explicitly abrogate the tribe’s immunity 
within the relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1056. 
 43 See Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1056–57. Specifically, § 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 
includes a clause abrogating the immunity of “governmental units.” 11 U.S.C. § 106(a). Further, the 
definition of “governmental unit” within the Bankruptcy Code includes a clause that “other foreign or 
domestic governments” are considered governmental units under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 101(27). 
 44 See Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1057–58 (stating that the Supreme Court has referred to 
Indian tribes both as a domestic dependent nation and as a domestic sovereign in previous rulings); 
see, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (explaining that Indian tribes 
are similar to domestic sovereigns); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 
U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (explaining that Indian tribes are “domestic dependent nations” (quoting Chero-
kee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831))). 
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the Bankruptcy Code.45 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit analyzed a previous Su-
preme Court case regarding the abrogation of immunity for individual states to 
further support its position.46 Using this precedent, the court noted that a statute 
does not need to use “magic words” specifically identifying an individual group 
to prove Congress’s intent to abrogate immunity from such a group.47 
The Ninth Circuit thus found unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate 
tribal immunity through the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.48 The court 
reached this decision because Congress was aware of Supreme Court decisions 
referring to Indian tribes as domestic governments as well as decisions finding 
unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate a state’s immunity without men-
tioning the states by name.49 
B. Unequivocal Intent Must Leave No Doubt: The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis 
of the Unequivocal Congressional Intent Requirement 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion, the Seventh Circuit has ruled 
that a statute must leave no doubt as to congressional intent in order for immuni-
ty to be abrogated.50 In 2016, in Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Congress 
did not express an unequivocal intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity 
through the Fair and Accurate Credit Reporting Act (FACTA).51 Similar to the 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1058 (explaining that these tribes are just a specific in-
stance of the domestic governments from which Congress intended to abrogate immunity). 
 46 See id. (explaining that the Supreme Court previously held that unequivocal congressional 
intent to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity can be found without mentioning the individual states 
by name in any one section of the statute in question); see, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62, 73–74 (2000) (holding that Congress unequivocally intended to abrogate the sovereign im-
munity of states in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 despite not listing states in the 
section of the act relating to the abrogation of immunity). 
 47 See Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1059, 1061 (explaining that the Navajo Nation tribe is a 
specific example of a domestic government and that Congress does not need to explicitly name the 
tribe to abrogate its immunity, just as Congress does not need to specifically list individual states to 
abrogate their immunity). 
 48 Id. at 1061. 
 49 See id. at 1058 (holding that congressional intent to abrogate tribal immunity in the Bankruptcy 
Code was unequivocal as Indian tribes are domestic governments, and Congress abrogated immunity 
from all domestic governments); id. at 1059 (explaining that Congress does not need to list out every 
example of a generic term to show that it intended to abrogate immunity from every entity included 
within the generic definition). 
 50 Compare Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 2016) (con-
cluding that simply because an Indian tribe is a government and that Congress abrogated immunity for 
governments is not sufficient evidence to find unequivocal congressional intent), with Krystal Energy 
Co., 357 F.3d at 1061 (holding that because an Indian tribe is a domestic government and the relevant 
sections of the Bankruptcy Code abrogated immunity as to domestic governments, that Congress 
expressed unequivocal intent to abrogate immunity from Indian tribes). 
 51 Meyers, 836 F.3d at 827. In this case, the plaintiff purchased items using a credit card from 
three separate stores that the Oneida tribe owned in Green Bay, Wisconsin. Id. at 820. The receipts for 
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Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit began its assessment of congressional intent 
by inspecting the text of the statute itself.52 The Seventh Circuit further noted 
that the Supreme Court previously ruled that any ambiguity within a federal law 
must be interpreted in favor of the Indian tribe and its immunity.53 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, however, the Seventh Circuit did not analyze 
whether the Indian tribe could potentially be included within FACTA’s defini-
tion of a person.54 The Seventh Circuit instead attempted to identify any evi-
dence of congressional intent to abrogate the tribal immunity.55 Further, the court 
ruled that in order for Congress to demonstrate its intent, it must make a clear 
statement.56 The Seventh Circuit questioned Congress’s intent here because 
Congress had specifically abrogated the sovereign immunity from Indian tribes 
in other statutes but chose not to do so in FACTA.57 The Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that FACTA was facially ambiguous, as the statute did not specifically 
mention Indian tribes by name, and therefore held that the statute lacked suffi-
cient evidence of congressional intent to abrogate tribal immunity.58 
                                                                                                                           
these items contained information about the plaintiff’s credit card that was illegal to print under the 
Fair and Accurate Credit Reporting Act (FACTA). Id. FACTA prohibits any individual or business 
that accepts credit cards from printing on the receipt more than the last five digits of a purchaser’s 
credit card number and the credit card’s expiration date. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2018). The statute states 
that any “person” who fails to comply with these provisions is liable. Id. § 1681n. It then defines a 
“person” as “any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, govern-
ment or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity.” Id. § 1681a. As the receipts printed by 
tribe-owned stores contained the plaintiff’s full credit card number and expiration date, the plaintiff 
instituted a class action lawsuit against the tribe for violating these FACTA provisions. Meyers, 836 
F.3d at 820. In response, the Oneida tribe moved to dismiss this claim as the tribe believed it pos-
sessed tribal immunity. Id. The district court subsequently dismissed this class action lawsuit as the 
court agreed that the Oneida tribe possessed tribal sovereign immunity from such a suit. Id. at 820–21. 
 52 See Meyers, 836 F.3d at 824 (noting that the statute at issue did not specifically include Indian 
tribes within the definition of a person). 
 53 Id. at 827. 
 54 See id. at 826 (explaining that the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim because of a lack 
of evidence regarding congressional intent, not because Indian tribes are not governments). Although 
the definition of a person in FACTA includes the phrase “government or governmental subdivision,” 
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that Congress did not unequivocally intend for this phrase to cover Indi-
an tribes, as it concluded that this phrase was ambiguous. Id. 
 55 See id. (explaining that the argument set forth by the plaintiff—and therefore the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s rationale in Krystal Energy—“misse[d] the point,” as the real issue in this case was assessing 
congressional intent, not whether an Indian tribe fits the definition of a government). 
 56 Id. at 827. 
 57 See id. (noting that unequivocal congressional intent is only present when the court has “perfect 
confidence” that Congress intended to abrogate the tribal immunity). The court further emphasized the 
difference between a statute of general applicability and being shielded from suit through immunity, 
and it concluded that simply because a statute generally applies to everyone does not mean that plain-
tiffs are able to sue sovereigns that possess immunity. Id.  
 58 See id. (holding that the tribe did possess sovereign immunity under FACTA and affirming the 
district court’s grant of the defendant tribe’s motion to dismiss). 
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C. Recognizing the Ambiguity: The Sixth Circuit’s  
Agreement with the Seventh Circuit 
Similar to the Seventh Circuit, the Sixth Circuit focused on the principle 
that any ambiguity in a statute should be interpreted in a manner that favors the 
tribe and its immunity.59 In 2019, in Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Sault 
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Congress did not 
unequivocally intend to abrogate tribal immunity through the Bankruptcy Code 
of 1978.60 
The Sixth Circuit also agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the key question 
to consider when assessing tribal immunity is whether Congress unequivocally 
expressed its intent to abrogate it, and not whether Indian tribes could be implic-
itly included within a definition from the statute in question.61 Although the Sev-
enth Circuit in Meyers assessed FACTA while the Sixth Circuit focused on the 
Bankruptcy Code, the Sixth Circuit drew a parallel between these two cases, as 
both courts needed to assess whether a general abrogation of immunity extended 
to a specific member of a general class.62 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Con-
gress only expresses an unequivocal intent in instances where it leaves no doubt 
as to its intention to abrogate the immunity.63 
The Sixth Circuit then concluded that Congress had created some level of 
doubt through the definitions in the Bankruptcy Code, as evidenced by courts 
throughout the country reaching different conclusions as to Congress’s intent.64 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (In re 
Greektown Holdings, LLC III), 917 F.3d 451, 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that Congress did not 
unequivocally intend to abrogate tribal immunity in a statute that the court determined to be ambigu-
ous). 
 60 Id. at 463. 
 61 See id. at 459 (stating that Indian tribes are both domestic and a form of government, but that 
simply because Indian tribes could fit within the definition of “domestic government” was not rele-
vant to determining whether congressional intent to abrogate immunity was unequivocal). 
 62 See id. at 458 (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s observation in Krystal Energy—that there are no 
other statutes where Congress generally abrogated sovereign immunity but left open questions regard-
ing specific members of the generally immune class—was incorrect as evidenced by the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding in Meyers). 
 63 See id. at 457 (explaining that, because any ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of the 
Indian tribe, Congress must leave no doubt as to its intent); see also Meyers, 836 F.3d at 827 (noting 
that to demonstrate unequivocal intent, “Congress’ words must fit like a glove.”). The requirement of 
leaving no doubt as to Congress’s intent initially developed when the Supreme Court consulted the 
Webster’s Dictionary definition of “unequivocal”, which was defined as “proof that admits no doubt.” 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY (1961)). 
 64 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 457. Compare Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 
1061 (holding that Congress unequivocally intended to abrogate tribal immunity in the Bankruptcy 
Code), with Bucher v. Dakota Fin. Corp. (In re Whitaker), 474 B.R. 687, 695 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that Congress did not unequivocally intend to abrogate tribal immunity by enacting the 
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As a result of this perceived ambiguity, the Sixth Circuit ultimately held that 
Congress did not unequivocally intend to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity 
through the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus interpreted the ambigu-
ities in favor of tribal immunity.65 
III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S PROPER APPLICATION OF  
THE UNEQUIVOCAL INTENT STANDARD 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in In re Greektown Holdings, 
LLC III that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code does not abrogate tribal im-
munity is consistent with the historical treatment and policy goals of providing 
immunity to Indian tribes.66 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit properly applied the 
unequivocal congressional intent standard.67 
Since at least 1940, Indian tribes have possessed immunity from suit under 
federal law, unless the tribe waives the immunity or Congress specifically abro-
gates it.68 The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld this doctrine of tribal im-
                                                                                                                           
Bankruptcy Code of 1978), and Subranni v. Navajo Times Publ’g Co. (In re Star Group Communs., 
Inc.), 568 B.R. 616, 622 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2016) (same). 
 65 In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 463. The Sixth Circuit then needed to consider 
whether the Tribe’s conduct in the bankruptcy proceedings waived the Tribe’s immunity. Id. Relying 
on precedent from other circuits, the court first noted that filing a lawsuit shows a clear intention on 
behalf of an Indian tribe to waive any immunity it possesses. Id. at 464. The court, however, also held 
that the alter-ego doctrine is inapplicable to the consideration of tribal waivers of immunity, as this 
doctrine would require an implication of waiver, and the Supreme Court has held that waivers of tribal 
immunity cannot be implied. Id. at 465 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 
(1978)); see Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 584 
B.R. 706, 712 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (noting the plaintiffs’ argument that the Debtors, acting as the 
Tribe’s alter-ego, waived immunity by filing for bankruptcy protection). Finally, the Sixth Circuit 
needed to consider whether the filing of the bankruptcy petition itself waived the immunity related to 
a separate fraudulent transfer claim. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 466. The court 
ultimately declined to consider these actions a waiver of tribal immunity, as Indian tribes had no input 
in ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution, unlike states, which can waive 
their immunity through filing a bankruptcy petition. Id. After concluding on these three issues, the 
Sixth Circuit ultimately dismissed the Trustee’s complaint in its entirety. Id. at 467. 
 66 See Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (In re 
Greektown Holdings, LLC III), 917 F.3d 451, 462–63 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting that, based on previous 
rulings, courts should “tread lightly” in assessing tribal immunity without clear congressional intent); 
see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1980) (stating that the 
overarching policy of maintaining tribal sovereign immunity is to encourage tribal independence); 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (explaining that Indian tribes are exempt from 
suit unless Congress authorizes the lawsuit). 
 67 See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 
(1976)) (stating that a tribe waives sovereign immunity only through an unequivocal expression); In 
re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 461 (explaining that intent must be unequivocal in order 
for Congress to have abrogated tribal immunity). 
 68 See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (holding explicitly for the 
first time that Indian tribes possess a level of immunity from suit); see also Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. 
Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) (explaining that Indian tribes have immunity from suit so long as the 
tribes did not waive the immunity and Congress did not abrogate such immunity). 
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munity, as the Court has found this immunity necessary to protect tribes’ ability 
to govern themselves.69 As such, by holding that Congress did not intend to ab-
rogate Indian tribal immunity in this case, the Sixth Circuit protected tribal abil-
ity to self-govern and placed the burden on Congress to make any changes to the 
doctrine of tribal immunity.70 
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit properly applied the standard that Congress 
must unequivocally express its intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity 
through a statute.71 Although there is a strong argument that Indian tribes are 
indeed both domestic and a form of government, the court correctly determined 
that the key question in In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III was whether Con-
gress expressed its unequivocal intent to abrogate immunity from Indian tribes.72 
Congress has included specific clauses abrogating immunity from Indian tribes 
within other statutes, so by not specifically mentioning Indian tribes within the 
Bankruptcy Code, Congress left some doubt as to its intentions.73 As all ambigu-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 
890 (1986) (stating that the sovereign immunity is necessary to allow Indian tribes to continue with 
their self-governance); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334–35 (1983) (stating 
that tribes should have the ability to manage themselves to encourage the broader goal of tribal self-
sufficiency); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (same). 
 70 See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 143–44 (stating that courts have attempted to be 
consistent with the belief that tribal self-governments need to be protected); In re Greektown Hold-
ings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 462 (citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790, (2014)) 
(explaining that courts should not assume Congress intends to infringe upon an Indian tribe’s right to 
self-governance). 
 71 See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59 (holding that congressional intent must be unequivocal 
in order for an Indian tribe to be subject to suit); In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 463 
(holding that congressional intent to abrogate tribal immunity in the enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Code was not unequivocal); see also Greggory W. Dalton, Comment, A Failure of Expression: How 
the Provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code Fail to Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 81 WASH L. 
REV. 645, 647 (2006) (explaining that general phrases, such as “other foreign or domestic govern-
ments” have historically been deemed insufficient to abrogate immunity under the unequivocal ex-
pression standard). 
 72 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (explaining that the congressional 
intent must be “unmistakably clear” to abrogate immunity from states (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 
U.S. 223, 228 (1989))); In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 457, 459 (noting that the key 
question in tribal immunity is whether Congress made an unequivocal expression and left no doubt as 
to the clarity of its intent); Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1057 (stating that the Supreme Court has 
previously held that Indian tribes were “domestic dependent nations,” as well as a form of govern-
ment). 
 73 See In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 457 (explaining that Congress has previ-
ously demonstrated an ability to clearly and unequivocally express its intent to abrogate immunity 
from Indian tribes); see also 25 U.S.C. § 5321 (2018) (stating, in a statute covering liability insurance 
for Indian tribes, that the tribe and its insurance carrier “shall waive any right it may have to raise as a 
defense the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe from suit”); Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903, 6972 (2018) (stating that under this act, citizens can bring suits 
against any “person” and that “person” includes “municipalities,” which also includes Indian tribes); 
Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
Congress abrogated tribal immunity within the Safe Water Drinking Act of 1974 as the statute specifi-
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ities within statutes are to be construed in a manner that favors the Indian tribes 
and their immunity, the Sixth Circuit properly concluded that the congressional 
intent behind the Bankruptcy Code was ambiguous and therefore tribal immuni-
ty was not abrogated.74 
The Sixth Circuit stopped short of holding that Congress needs to specifi-
cally mention Indian tribes by name to unequivocally express its intent to abro-
gate immunity.75 Based on the standard that Congress must leave absolutely no 
doubt as to its intent, however, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where Con-
gress unequivocally expresses an intent without mentioning Indian tribes by 
name.76 As such, the Sixth Circuit should have taken its holding a step further by 
requiring that Congress specifically mention Indian tribes by name to abrogate 
their immunity.77 
This decision in In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III will have a significant 
impact on Indian tribes moving forward.78 Historically, this doctrine has allowed 
the Indian tribes to conduct their affairs without fear of being sued and to pre-
vent potentially large monetary losses that could negatively impact the financial 
well-being of the tribe and the federal government as a whole.79 If the Sixth Cir-
                                                                                                                           
cally mentions Indian tribes within the definition of municipalities, and that municipalities are consid-
ered “persons” that can be sued under the act).  
 74 See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 143–44 (holding that the ambiguity in any fed-
eral law is construed in a manner that favors tribal independence); In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 
917 F.3d at 461. 
 75 See In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 461 (declining to hold that a statute must 
mention Indian tribes by name to constitute an unequivocal expression of intent). 
 76 See Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis., 836 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 
Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Papas (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC II), 532 B.R. 680, 693 
(E.D. Mich. 2015)) (explaining that the Supreme Court has never found sufficient congressional intent 
in a statute that does not specifically mention Indian tribes by name); see also Dalton, supra note 71, 
at 666 (noting that just because a phrase logically seems to include Indian tribes does not mean that 
Congress necessarily intended for tribes to be included). 
 77 See In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 461 (noting that the Bankruptcy Code is 
not sufficiently clear as it does not mention Indian tribes by name); see also Meyers, 836 F.3d at, 827 
(explaining that congressional intent is not sufficiently clear in a statute that does not mention Indian 
tribes by name). Although requiring that Congress specifically mention Indian tribes within a statute 
to abrogate tribal immunity would be consistent with all previous Supreme Court rulings, this pro-
posed rule could be inconsistent with other methods of statutory interpretation. See Fed. Aviation 
Admin. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291 (2018) (citing Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 
589 (2008)) (noting, in the context of state sovereign immunity, that the Court has never required 
Congress to state its intent in any particular manner, and that courts should still use other tools of 
statutory construction in assessing whether congressional intent is unequivocal and not rely solely on 
the express words in the statute).  
 78 See In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 462 (noting that assessing the limits of 
tribal immunity is a “grave question” and “the answer will affect all tribes, not just the one before us.” 
(quoting Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018))). 
 79 See Seelau, supra note 2, at 140 (explaining that Congress has justified the need for tribal im-
munity because tribes have limited capital and may be unable to pay large damages, which could lead 
to immediate bankruptcy if a tribe is sued). The tribes’ lack of fear of being sued has also led to poten-
tially unfair verdicts for parties that are unable to recover damages from interactions with tribes in 
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cuit had reached the opposite conclusion, it would have impacted all tribes, as 
this ruling would unilaterally reduce the strict requirement that congressional 
intent be unequivocal and therefore lead to other similar decisions.80 This change 
in the congressional intent standard would allow courts to shoe-horn Indian 
tribes into many other statutory definitions, greatly reducing the Indian tribes’ 
ability to be protected from suit.81 Such a ruling would therefore be inconsistent 
with the historical treatment of these tribes.82 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in In re Greektown Holdings, 
LLC III properly recognized that assessing whether Congress abrogated tribal 
immunity is principally an issue of congressional intent. Although the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals’ logic that Indian tribes could fit within the definition of 
“governmental units” under the Bankruptcy Code is reasonable, it fails to 
properly consider the issue of congressional intent, and instead solely strives to 
infer a term within the definition of a statute. The approach used by the Sixth 
and Seventh Circuits requiring unequivocal congressional intent is consistent 
with Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, this ruling allows tribes to remain 
protected from potential lawsuits, which was the original purpose behind the 
tribal immunity doctrine. As such, the Sixth Circuit’s decision that Congress did 
not intend to abrogate tribal immunity through the enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Code follows the best method of assessing congressional intent. This case, and 
the standard used to assess tribal sovereign immunity, could receive additional 
exposure in the coming months as the Trustee filed a petition for writ of certiora-
ri to the Supreme Court in March 2019, and this petition is currently pending as 
of the date of this Comment. 
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which such parties were unaware that they were dealing with a tribe. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 
758 (explaining that, in our evolving society, the powers of tribal sovereign immunity have extended 
far beyond the doctrine’s original purpose of protecting tribal self-governance); see also Malasky, 
supra note 4, at 2472 (explaining that although Indian tribes have caused injustices without repercus-
sions, courts have determined that adjusting the boundaries of tribal sovereignty is not the job of the 
judicial system). 
 80 See In re Greektown Holdings, LLC III, 917 F.3d at 462 (explaining that this unequivocal re-
quirement standard exists because of the negative impact that all tribes would feel if an additional 
limit was placed on tribal immunity). 
 81 See Meyers, 836 F.3d at 827 (explaining that it is not the job of courts to force Indian tribes 
into a statutory definition that could potentially be inconsistent with congressional intent). 
 82 See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758 (explaining that historically Congress, rather than the courts, 
have placed limits on tribal immunity). 
